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a b s t r a c t
Understanding how people with delusions arrive at false conclusions is central to the reﬁnement of cognitive
behavioural interventions. Making hasty decisions based on limited data (‘jumping to conclusions’, JTC) is one
potential causal mechanism, but reasoning errors may also result from other processes. In this study, we
investigated the correlates of reasoning errors under differing task conditions in 204 participants with
schizophrenia spectrum psychosis who completed three probabilistic reasoning tasks. Psychotic symptoms,
affect, and IQ were also evaluated. We found that hasty decision makers were more likely to draw false
conclusions, but only 37% of their reasoning errors were consistent with the limited data they had gathered.
The remainder directly contradicted all the presented evidence. Reasoning errors showed task-dependent
associations with IQ, affect, and psychotic symptoms. We conclude that limited data-gathering contributes to
false conclusions but is not the only mechanism involved. Delusions may also be maintained by a tendency to
disregard evidence. Low IQ and emotional biases may contribute to reasoning errors in more
complex situations. Cognitive strategies to reduce reasoning errors should therefore extend beyond
encouragement to gather more data, and incorporate interventions focused directly on these difﬁculties.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
In cognitive models of psychosis, reasoning errors are hypothe-
sised to contribute to both the onset and the maintenance of
delusions (e.g. Garety et al., 2007). People with psychosis are held
to be prone to reasoning errors because of the increased frequency
of characteristic cognitive biases and information processing difﬁ-
culties associated with psychosis (Hemsley and Garety, 1986; Garety
and Freeman, 1999, 2013; Freeman, 2007, So et al., 2010). Psycho-
logical interventions designed to help people with delusions
therefore target cognitive biases. The aim of the intervention is to
modify or compensate for the biases, in order to reduce reasoning
errors, and thereby facilitate belief change (e.g. Fowler et al., 1995).
However, the effect sizes achieved by these interventions remain
small, indicating the need for further development (NICE, 2009).
Therapy advances could be informed by progress in two key areas.
First, a better understanding of the nature and strength of the
relationship between cognitive biases and reasoning errors would
inform how much emphasis to place on cognitive biases when
intervening with delusions. Second, an investigation of the con-
tribution of other processes to reasoning errors would identify
additional foci for intervention.
In this study, we set out to test the association between cognitive
biases and reasoning errors, and to investigate the contribution to
reasoning errors of other candidate psychological processes. We
chose to investigate the ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) data-
gathering bias as this is the cognitive bias most robustly associated
with psychosis. The bias manifests as the tendency to make hasty
decisions with certainty on the basis of little evidence, and is reliably
found in approximately half of people with schizophrenia. It is
particularly associated with delusions. Around a ﬁfth of the general
population also jump to conclusions, and this percentage is increased
in the context of high delusional ideation, an at-risk mental state, and
in those who have recovered from psychosis (Garety and Freeman,
2013; Garety et al., 2011; Fine et al., 2007; Peters and Garety, 2006;
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Peters et al., 2008; Woodward et al., 2009; van Dael et al., 2006;
Broome et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2005). The bias is usually
assessed by the probabilistic reasoning paradigm, which involves
weighing evidence to make decisions, for example, deciding from
which of two jars of coloured beads a particular series of beads is
being drawn. Most versions of the task employ neutral and abstract
material (such as coloured beads) to minimise the inﬂuence of other
social, affective and cognitive factors on reasoning. The jars may
contain beads in an easily discriminable (e.g. 85:15) ratio, or in
proportions that are less readily discriminable (e.g. 60:40). The
sequence of draws and the ‘correct’ response are usually predeter-
mined, allowing manipulation of the degree of ambiguity of the
evidence, and its information value. Emotional versions of the task
have been developed, using, for example, words describing person-
ality attributes selected from a survey. The JTC bias has been
operationally deﬁned as reaching a decision after fewer than three
beads or words (e.g. Garety et al., 2005).
New psychological interventions for people with delusions,
designed to speciﬁcally target cognitive biases, have been demon-
strated to reduce the tendency to JTC on probabilistic reasoning tasks,
by extending data-gathering. Such interventions lead to small, but
clinically meaningful, changes in delusional beliefs and in quality of life
(Woodward et al., 2009; Moritz et al., 2011, 2013; Ross et al., 2011;
Waller et al., 2011; Garety et al., 2011). The implication is that
reasoning errors, which usually act to maintain delusions, are reduced
by extending data-gathering, thereby facilitating belief change.
Accounts of probabilistic reasoning in psychosis (White and
Mansell, 2009; Moutoussis et al., 2011) identify three key mechanisms
contributing to hasty decision making and linking it to reasoning
errors: the information processing difﬁculties associated with acute
psychotic symptoms, leading to reliance on salience at the expense of
context; neurocognitive deﬁcits or poor task understanding; and
affective or motivational processes, such as threat-related processing
or impulsivity. Evidence to date suggests a multifactorial model: the
JTC bias is not restricted to those with acute psychosis (Garety et al.,
1991; Hemsley, 2005; Peters and Garety, 2006; So et al., 2010;
Speechley et al., 2010; Balzan et al., 2012), neurocognitive deﬁcits or
limited understanding (Freeman et al., 2008; van Dael et al., 2006;
Garety et al., 1991, 2005; Bentall et al., 2009; Lincoln et al., 2010a;
Menon et al., 2006; Mortimer et al., 1996; Dudley et al., 2011; Ormrod
et al., 2012; Garety et al., 2013). Emotional content increases the
tendency to JTC in all participants, irrespective of the presence of
psychosis (Dudley and Over, 2003; Fine et al., 2007; Ellett et al., 2008;
So et al., 2008; Lincoln et al., 2010b; Freeman et al., 2006; Colbert and
Peters, 2002).
However, although task characteristics appear to be of little
signiﬁcance in the tendency to JTC (Garety et al., 2005; So et al.,
2012), there is evidence for a psychosis-speciﬁc differential effect
of task difﬁculty (ratio discriminability, ambiguity of evidence) and
of both emotional and perceptual salience on reasoning errors (e.g.
Speechley et al., 2010; Lincoln et al., 2010a; Dudley et al., 2011:
Warman et al., 2007; Ormrod et al., 2012). This in turn suggests
that reasoning errors may be inﬂuenced by psychological factors
other than the tendency to make hasty decisions.
A comprehensive analysis of the factors contributing to reason-
ing errors, both between participants and between different tasks,
should help to clarify the relative contributions of different
psychological processes, and thereby increase the effectiveness
of the new, brief cognitive interventions aimed at improving
reasoning skills in psychosis.
1.1. The current study
We set out to investigate, in people with psychosis, the
association of reasoning errors with the JTC bias (hasty decisions,
based on limited data), positive psychotic symptoms (as an index
of a salience-based information processing style), emotional pro-
cesses and IQ on probabilistic reasoning tasks that differed in ratio
discriminability, ambiguity of the evidence, and emotional con-
tent. The sample partly overlapped with that of So et al. (2012), but
the focus of the two studies was entirely different: a detailed
analysis of the process correlates of reasoning errors between
tasks has not previously been undertaken.
We considered reasoning errors in two ways: ﬁrstly, at the level
of the participant, identifying the characteristics of those prone to
making reasoning errors; and secondly at the level of the indivi-
dual response on each task (three per participant), identifying
differences in the correlates of errors between tasks.
We tested two hypotheses:
(1) the JTC bias will be associated with reasoning errors
(2) independently of their association with the JTC bias, reasoning
errors will show task-speciﬁc associations with the other
psychological processes implicated in probabilistic reasoning
in people with psychosis. Speciﬁcally, we hypothesised that: (i)
reasoning errors on the emotional version of the task would be
more inﬂuenced by affective processes; (ii) cognitive deﬁcits
would play a more signiﬁcant role on harder (high ambiguity,
low discriminability) versions of the task; and (iii) on easy
(low ambiguity, high discriminability), neutral versions of the
task, in the context of reduced inﬂuence of cognitive deﬁcits
and emotional factors, reasoning errors would be primarily
inﬂuenced by levels of positive psychotic symptomatology, as
an index of the salience-based information processing style
associated with acute psychosis.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
The 204 individuals with a recent relapse of psychosis who took part in the current
study represented all participants who completed a probabilistic reasoning task in the
Psychological Prevention of Relapse in Psychosis Trial (PRP, Garety et al., 2008;
ISRCTN83557988). The PRP Trial was a UK-based multicentre randomized controlled
trial of cognitive behavioural therapy and family intervention for psychosis, recruiting in
four National Health Service Trusts in London and East Anglia. Trial inclusion criteria
were: aged between 18 and 65 years; a second or subsequent episode of psychosis
starting not more than 3 months before consent to enter the trial; a current diagnosis of
non-affective psychosis (schizophrenia, schizoaffective psychosis, delusional disorder),
according to ICD-10 criteria and conﬁrmed by SCAN interview conducted by trained
raters (Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry, WHO, 1992a, 1992b); and
a rating at initial assessment of at least 4 (moderate severity) on at least one positive
psychotic symptom in the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS, Kay, 1991). The
exclusion criteria comprised: a primary diagnosis of alcohol or substance dependency;
organic syndrome or learning disability; inadequate command of English to engage in
psychological therapy with an English-speaking therapist; unstable residential arrange-
ments. For the current study, all participants scored on a delusion item of the SCAN
(Section 19, ratingZ1) or PANSS (Items 1, 5 or 641) during their trial participation.
2.2. Measures
Demographic information (age, self-reported ethnicity, length of illness, gen-
der) was collected from the participant by self-report and corroborated with the
clinical record. Length of illness was deﬁned as the time in years since ﬁrst
presenting to services with a schizophrenia spectrum disorder until the point of
consent to participate in the current study.
2.2.1. Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS, Kay, 1991).
The PANSS comprises 30 items for rating psychotic symptomatology (seven
positive; seven negative; and 16 general symptomatology). Each item is rated on a
7-point scale ranging from 1 (absent) to 7 (extreme). Symptoms are rated over
the past 7 days. The mean of the delusions items from the positive scale (Item 1
(Delusions), Item 5 (Grandiosity) and Item 6 (Suspiciousness/Persecution))
was used as an index of current delusion severity, rated on the same scale; a score
of 4 or more (moderate severity) on any of these scales was taken to indicate
the current presence of a delusion. The 5-factor solution to the PANSS (van der Gaag et
al., 2006) was used in this study, providing factor scores for positive symptoms;
negative symptoms; disorganisation; excitement and emotion (anxiety/depression).
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2.2.2. Probabilistic reasoning tasks
We used three variants of the probabilistic reasoning task, one easy emotion-
ally neutral task with beads in a high discriminability (85:15) ratio and unambig-
uous evidence; a hard neutral task with beads in a low discriminability (60:40)
ratio with more ambiguous evidence, and a hard emotional task, with personality
descriptors in a 60:40 ratio and ambiguous evidence. Participants were told that
they could see as many items as they wished before making a decision and to
decide only when they were certain. Instructions were standardised and presented
on a computer screen using the wording of Garety et al. (2005). Draws, and the
‘correct’ decision, were predetermined, as illustrated in Table 1. In the 85:15 task,
the ﬁrst two beads drawn were of a consistent colour and indicative of the overall
correct (mostly orange) jar. At no point during the task did the overall pattern of
beads indicate the incorrect (mostly black) jar. In the 60:40 beads task, the ﬁrst
bead indicated the overall correct (mostly blue) jar, but was contradicted by the
next bead. As the harder task progressed, the pattern of presented beads mostly
favoured the correct jar. However, at one decision point the evidence favoured the
incorrect jar (at bead three; two red beads and one blue bead presented), and at
three further decision points both jars were equally supported by the evidence
(beads two, four and six). The emotional task followed an identical pattern of draws
to the hard neutral task, with the ‘mostly negative’ survey designated as correct.
Reasoning errors therefore, usually involved choosing the ‘mostly positive’ survey, a
tendency which might be inﬂuenced by mood.
Using the standard coding of errors (choosing the jar designated ‘incorrect’,
Garety et al., 2005), half of the guesses made in response to equivocal evidence are
coded as correct decisions, as are correct guesses made before any beads are drawn.
Conversely, evidence-based decisions made when the evidence supports the
‘incorrect’ jar are counted as errors. However, in the current study reasoning errors
were the focus of attention: we wished to avoid arbitrary labelling of a response as
an error, and therefore deﬁned reasoning errors as responses that were not
supported by the accumulation of presented evidence (i.e. illogical responses).
Thus, on the easy task, choosing the mostly black jar at any point was considered to
be a reasoning error, coinciding with the standard coding of errors according to
experimentally determined jar. On the hard tasks, choosing the mostly red jar or
the positive survey at the ﬁrst, ﬁfth, or seventh and subsequent draws, the mostly
blue jar or the negative survey at the third draw, or either after two, four or six
draws was coded as a reasoning error. Decisions made before seeing any bead or
word, (i.e. at draw 0) were rated as a reasoning error. Thus, our error coding
differed from the standard method for a total of 42 decisions (two on 85:15; 19 on
60:40 beads; 21 on 60:40 emotional, see Table 1). In practice, error frequencies
were similar using the two methods (85:15 standard, n¼36 errors; this study,
n¼38 errors; 60:40 standard, n¼74 errors; this study, n¼80 errors; emotional,
n¼58 errors, this study, n¼53 errors). Repeated measures ANOVA showed no
effect of method of error coding (x2: new or standard) on error rates by task (x 3:
85:15, 60:40; emotional) or overall (F values all o1.7, p values all 40.2).
Errors were additionally coded according to their type: ‘inconsistent’ errors
contradicted the accumulated evidence; ‘equivocal’ errors were made in the
context of evidence equally supporting each jar choice. Salient errors were
consistent with the current draw, but not indicated by the accumulated evidence
and could be either inconsistent (e.g. choosing the black jar on draw 4 (black) in the
85:15 task, after already seeing three orange beads), or equivocal (e.g. choosing the
red jar on draw 2 (red) of the 60:40 task, having already seen a blue bead). On the
emotional task, errors were also coded by whether or not the positive survey was
chosen. Making a decision after fewer than three draws was considered to be a
hasty decision, indicative of the JTC bias (Garety et al., 2005; So et al., 2012).
Responses on each task (three responses per participant) were recorded.
Participants were grouped dichotomously according to whether they made a
reasoning error on any completed task, and according to whether they made a
hasty decision (after fewer than three draws) on any completed task.
2.2.3. The Quick Test (Ammons and Ammons, 1962)
The Quick Test was used to provide an estimate of current intellectual
functioning (IQ). The task was completed only by those whose ﬁrst language was
English, as it is not standardised for respondents answering in a second language.
Table 1
Pattern of draws in each probabilistic reasoning task and frequency counts of decisions by draw at response level (n¼599 responses across n¼204 participants).
Draw 
no.
Easy task (85:15 beads) Hard task (60:40 beads) Emotional task (words)
JTC Bead
Colour
Decision (n) Bead
Colour
Decision (n)
Word type
Decision (n)
Black Orange Red Blue Positive Negative
0a
HASTY
2 2 6 0 2 1
1 Orange 17 46 Blue 23 37 Negative 12 48
2 Orange 6 32 Red 8 4 Positive 5 4
3
NON-
HASTY
Orange 5 36 Red 13 7 Positive 26 7
4 Black 4 12 Blue 10 6 Negative 6 6
5 Orange 0 11 Blue 6 12 Negative 3 13
6 Orange 0 4 Red 5 2 Positive 3 3
7 Orange 1 6 Blue 0 6 Negative 0 9
8 Black 0 3 Blue 1 14 Negative 0 12
9 Orange 0 3 Blue 0 5 Negative 0 12
10 Orange 0 2 Red 0 11 Positive 1 3
11 Orange 0 5 Blue 0 5 Negative 0 5
12 Black 0 0 Blue 1 3 Negative 0 4
13 Orange 0 0 Blue 0 1 Negative 0 1
14 Orange 0 0 Blue 0 1 Negative 0 2
15 Black 0 1 Red 0 2 Positive 0 0
16 Orange 0 0 Red 0 1 Positive 0 0
17 Orange 0 2 Blue 0 0 Negative 0 0
18 Orange 0 0 Red 0 0 Positive 0 0
19 Orange 0 0 Red 0 1 Positive 0 0
20 Orange 1 3 Blue 1 8 Negative 0 7
Total responses
All tasks: 599
85:15
204
36 168
60:40
200
74 126
Emotional
195
58 137
Hasty responses 
All tasks: 255
105 25 80 78 37 41 72 19 53
Reasoning errors
All tasks: 171
38 36 2 80 61 19 53 32 21
Key: Grey shading=‘Error’; JTC: Jumping to Conclusions data-gathering bias; aDecisions made without seeing any data.
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2.3. Procedure
All measures were completed during a baseline assessment; symptom mea-
sures always preceded the reasoning task and the IQ measure. Reasoning tasks
were always completed in the same order, beginning with the 85:15 task, then the
neutral 60:40 task, then the emotional 60:40 task. Full ethical approval was
obtained prior to the onset of the study, and all participants gave informed consent
(South East National Research Ethics Service Committee ref. 01/1/14).
2.4. Analysis
Analyses were completed using SPSS version 20 (IBM, 2011) and STATA 12
(Statacorp, 2011). All participants completed the 85:15 task, 10 participants did not
complete one or both of the other two tasks (n¼4 60:40; n¼9 emotional).
Participants with any missing data were excluded from relevant analyses, and n's
reported. The clinical and demographic characteristics of participants completing a
probabilistic reasoning task (and therefore included in the current study) were
compared to those who did not complete a probabilistic reasoning task, using
independent sample t-tests and Chi-square tests. For the participant level analyses
of errors, two groups were formed according to the dichotomous rating of whether
or not the participant made any reasoning errors (1¼made a reasoning error on at
least one task; 0¼no reasoning errors on any completed task). For the response
level analyses, decisions were coded dichotomously according to whether or not
they were an error (1¼error; 0¼not an error).
For the main analyses, we employed two series of logistic regression analyses
to investigate our hypotheses. For the ﬁrst set of analyses, at participant level, the
tendency to make reasoning errors was the dependent variable, and a dichot-
omised rating of JTC was the predictor variable (1¼ JTC on at least one task; 0¼no
JTC on any task). Demographic and clinical variables (age, self-reported ethnicity
(coded as White/Other), length of illness, gender), PANSS factor scores, IQ, and
delusion status were controlled.
The second hypothesis concerned differences in responses between tasks and
therefore required three separate repeated measures analyses, each focusing on one
of the hypothesised predictors of reasoning errors: IQ, PANSS Positive or PANSS
Emotion. The dependent variable in all analyses was whether or not a reasoning
error was made. Task type formed a within subjects variable with three levels, taking
the easy neutral task (85:15 beads) as the reference category, and comparing ﬁrstly
to the 60:40 task (Task 2) then the emotional task (Task 3). The independent variable
of primary interest in each analysis was the interaction between the relevant
predictor and task type, tested using an interaction term (predictor x task type),
controlling for predictor, task type, JTC, and demographic variables. We checked for
associations between JTC and predictor variables; none were found (ORs all equal to
1.0, p values40.3). Analyses were also repeated excluding JTC and demographic
variables, with identical results, therefore only results from the planned, fully
controlled analyses are reported. Post-hoc correlational analyses examined the
variation in reasoning errors with speed of decision making, and in delusion severity
according to error type, controlling for the tendency to make hasty decisions.
3. Results
3.1. Demographic and clinical characteristics
These are shown for the 204 participants who completed a
probabilistic reasoning task (and therefore participated in the
current study) in Table 2. The 97 participants in the PRP trial
who did not complete a probabilistic reasoning task and therefore
were not included in the current study did not differ on any
demographic variable, but did have a lower IQ score (Mean¼88.9,
S.D.¼16.3, n¼43, t¼2.3, d.f.¼234, p¼0.02). Clinically, they
scored higher on Excitement (Mean¼5.8, S.D.¼2.6, n¼97, t¼2.3,
d.f.¼145, p¼0.02) and Disorganisation (Mean¼18.0, S.D.¼6.1,
n¼97, t¼2.0, d.f.¼299, p¼0.04). No signiﬁcant differences were
found for age, gender, length of illness, ethnicity, diagnosis,
delusion severity, or any other PANSS factor score (t valueso1.5,
χ2 valueso6.0, p valueso0.05). Mean delusion severity was 3.3 (S.
D.¼1.2); the majority of participants (n¼163) had a current
delusion of at least moderate severity on the PANSS.
3.2. Pattern and correlates of reasoning errors at participant level
across all tasks
Of all participants, half made at least one reasoning error
(n¼106/204, 52%). Of these, 76 (72%) also jumped to conclusions.
Of those not making any reasoning errors (n¼98), 45 (46%)
jumped to conclusions. Table 2 shows the demographic and
clinical characteristics of those making and not making reasoning
errors. Binary logistic regression showed that the tendency to JTC
was a signiﬁcant predictor of the tendency to make reasoning
errors, with those showing the JTC bias being more than three
times as likely to make an error as those not jumping to conclu-
sions (OR¼3.2, 95% CI 1.6 to 6.1, p¼0.001), irrespective of
controlling for PANSS factor scores, demographic variables and
IQ. Those making reasoning errors did not differ from those
not making reasoning errors on any other demographic or clinical
variable, irrespective of controlling for the tendency to JTC (ORs
range from 0.6 to 1.0; t-valueso1.8; χ2 valueso1.6; p values
o0.05). The pattern was the same irrespective of controlling for
current delusion status. Those with a current delusion were almost
four times as likely to make an error than those without (OR¼3.8,
95% CI¼1.2 to 11.9, po0.05) (Table 3).
3.3. Pattern and correlates of reasoning errors at response/task level
Table 1 shows the frequencies of each response by draw and
task. Just over a quarter of all responses (171/599) were reasoning
errors, and almost half of all responses were hasty (255/599),
irrespective of whether or not they were correct. Over half of all
reasoning errors (96/171, 56%) were inconsistent (made in direct
contradiction to the evidence presented; e.g. choosing the mostly
Table 2
Demographic and clinical characteristics according to the presence of reasoning
errors at participant level.
Total Reasoning error
No Yes
n¼204 n¼98 n¼106
Mean (S.D.)/n (%)
JTC (%JTC/no JTC) 59/41 46/54 72/28
IQ (Quick Test)a 94.4 96.2 92.7
(14.0) (14.1) (13.8)
Age (years) 37.5 36.8 38.2
(11.1) (10.9) (11.3)
Gender (% male/female) 72/28 73/27 70/30
Ethnicity (%BME/non-BME) 27/73 24/76 31/69
Length of illness (years)b 10.4 10.1 10.6
(8.4) (8.5) (8.4)
PANSS factors
Emotion 10.3 10.6 10.0
(4.3) (4.6) (4.0)
Negative 13.4 13.7 13.1
(6.6) (6.4) (6.8)
Excitement 5.1 5.1 5.1
(1.9) (1.8) (1.9)
Disorganisation 16.7 16.0 17.3
(5.2) (5.1) (5.2)
Positive 18.6 18.3 18.9
(5.7) (5.8) (5.6)
Delusions 9.8 9.8 9.8
(3.6) (3.6) (3.6)
Other 8.1 7.7 8.4
(2.7) (2.8) (2.7)
% Current delusion 80 82 78
Diagnosis (%)
ICD F20 83 82 84
ICD F22 1 1 1
ICD F25 16 17 15
a Error n¼97; no error n¼93.
b Error n¼104; no error n¼9; S.D.¼standard deviation; JTC¼ Jumping to
conclusions data gathering bias; IQ¼ Intelligence quotient; BME¼Black and min-
ority ethnic; PANSS¼Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (Kay, 1991);
ICD¼ International Classiﬁcation of Disease (WHO, 1992a, 1992b).
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black jar, having seen only orange beads). The remainder were
made in the context of no data (13/171, 8%), or equivocal data (62/
171, 36%). Just over a ﬁfth of reasoning errors (38/171, 22%) were
attributable to salience, almost all in the context of equivocal data
(n¼35).
We examined the variation in the association of reasoning
errors with each potential psychological mechanism between
tasks, using repeated measures binary logistic regression, with
the 85:15 task as the reference category, compared ﬁrstly to the
60:40, then to the emotional task. As hypothesised, there were
signiﬁcant interactions between task type and IQ, PANSS Positive
and PANSS Emotion, independently of controlling for JTC and
demographic variables (Table 4). JTC remained a signiﬁcant pre-
dictor of reasoning errors in each repeated measures analysis (ORs
ranged from 2.1 to 2.4, p valuesr0.001). Differences were pre-
dominantly between the easy and hard neutral tasks. Reasoning
errors were more common on the hard neutral task, irrespective of
whether they were hasty or not, but not on the emotional task,
which did not differ from the easy neutral task. Mean scores
showed that reasoning errors on the easy neutral task (which were
all inconsistent) were associated with higher levels of PANSS
Positive than on the hard neutral task, while reasoning errors on
the latter were associated with lower IQ and lower PANSS Emotion
scores (Table 5). Frequency and severity of delusions were highest
for the hasty errors group on the 85:15 task, and the hasty correct
group (those choosing the negative survey) on the emotional task.
Post-hoc correlations, controlling for the tendency to JTC, were
used to identify the pattern of associations with error type. On the
85:15 task, hasty inconsistent errors were associated with higher IQ
(r¼0.2, p¼0.005, n¼187), positive symptoms (r¼0.2, p¼0.003,
n¼201) and delusion severity (r¼0.2, p¼0.01, n¼201). On the
60:40 task, hasty inconsistent errors were associated with low
levels of IQ (r¼0.2, p¼0.03, n¼184) and negative affect (r¼0.2,
p¼0.02, n¼197), but not delusion severity. On the emotional task,
both equivocal and salient positive errors were associated with
positive symptoms and delusion severity (r values all 0.2, p
valuesr0.02, n¼192), irrespective of whether they were hasty or
not; salient positive errors were also associated with lower levels of
negative affect (r¼0.14, po0.05, n¼192). No other error type
showed an association with any of the psychological mechanism
variables, or with delusion severity (r valueso0.15, p values40.05).
The rate of reasoning errors clearly decreased as the number of
Table 3
Frequency of errors by type for each probabilistic reasoning task at response level (n¼599 responses across n¼204 participants).
All (599) 8515 (204) 6040 (200) Emot (195) Emot þve (195)
Total errors 171 38 80 53 32
% of total responses 28% 19% 40% 27% 16%
Hasty responses (o3 draws) 255 105 78 72
% of total responses 42% 51% 39% 37%
Hasty errors 92 27 41 24 19
% of total errors 54% 71% 51% 45% 36%
% of total hasty responses 36% 26% 53% 33% 26%
No data 13 4 6 3 2
% hasty errors 14% 15% 15% 12.5% 8%
Inconsistent with data 58 23 23 12 12
% hasty errors 63% 85% 56% 50% 50%
Equivocal data 21 0 12 9 5
% hasty errors 23% 29% 37.5% 9%
Salient (all equivocal) 13 0 8 5 5
% hasty errors 14% 19% 21% 21%
Non-hasty errors 79 11 39 29 13
% of total errors 46% 29% 49% 54% 24%
% of total non-hasty responses 23% 11% 32% 24% 11%
Inconsistent with data 38 11 16 11 4
% non-hasty errors 48% 100% 41% 38% 31%
Equivocal data 41 0 23 18 9
% non-hasty errors 52% 59% 62% 69%
Salient 25 4 11 10 4
% non-hasty errors 32% 36% 28% 35% 31%
Inconsistent with data (%) 5 (20%) 4 (100%) 0 1 (10%) 1 (25%)
Equivocal data (%) 20 (80%) 0 11 (100%) 9 (90%) 3 (75%)
Key: Emot: Emotional task.
Table 4
Binary logistic regression at task level showing differences between tasks in the
association of clinical variables with reasoning errors (n¼599 decisions across
n¼204 participants).
Independent variablesa Predictora
IQ PANSS Positive PANSS Emotion
OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI)
p p p
JTC bias 2.4 2.1 2.2
(1.5–3.8) (1.4–3.3) (1.4–3.4)
o0.001 0.001 o0.001
Predictor 1.0 1.1 1.0
(1.0–1.1) (1.0–1.1) (0.9–1.1)
0.2 0.05 0.5
PredictorTask 2 (60:40)2 0.9 0.9 0.9
(0.92–0.98) (0.86–0.99) (0.82–0.97)
0.003 0.03 0.01
PredictorTask 3 (emot)b 1.0 0.9 1.0
(0.9–1.0) (0.9–1.0) 0.9–1.1
0.5 0.13 0.8
Key: PANSS: Positive & Negative Syndrome Scale (Kay, 1991); JTC: Jumping to
Conclusions data-gathering bias.
a Controlling for Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Length of Illness, Task.
b Reference category, 85:15 task; Emot: Emotional task; for relevant means see
Table 4.
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draws to decision increased, showing small but consistent bivariate
correlations overall (r¼0.22, po0.001, n¼599), and for each task
(r values range from 0.2 to 0.3, p valueso0.05).
4. Discussion
We set out to investigate the pattern and correlates of reason-
ing errors under differing task conditions, with the aim of testing
the association between the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias
(both the tendency to make hasty decisions and for those
decisions to be based on limited data) and reasoning errors, and
of identifying other processes contributing to reasoning errors. The
purpose was to inform the further development of targeted
cognitive therapy interventions designed to facilitate helpful belief
change for people with delusions.
We found strong associations between the tendency to make
reasoning errors and to make hasty decisions: the rate of reasoning
errors clearly decreased as the number of draws considered increased.
These ﬁndings support current models of intervention, and suggest
that helping people to gather more information should reduce reason-
ing errors, and consequently facilitate changes in delusions.
However, reasoning errors were associated with current delu-
sions, irrespective of making hasty decisions and half of the
reasoning errors were not hasty, suggesting additional routes by
which reasoning errors may arise, and inﬂuence delusions. Two
thirds of hasty errors, and around half of the total reasoning errors
were inconsistent, directly contradicting all the available evidence
(for example, seeing one or more orange beads and then deciding
on the black jar). Although this tendency has been noted pre-
viously (Lincoln et al., 2010a), the error rate was much higher in
our group. This was not the result of our particular methods of
coding (rates were slightly higher using standard coding, see
Table 1), but may reﬂect the clinical presentation of our partici-
pants, who had a history of delusions, a recent experience of
relapse, and continuing positive symptoms.
The tendency to make inconsistent errors was most evident on the
easy neutral task, on which some participants made contradictory
decisions despite successive pieces of evidence consistently indicating
the other jar. Participants showing this tendency had high levels of
delusions, consistent with a maintenance role. They also had high IQ
scores, suggesting the behaviour did not result from lack of ability or
understanding. Although the tendency was associated with positive
symptoms, contrary to hypothesis, salience did not appear to be the
mechanism underlying these errors. Rather, our ﬁndings suggest other
positive symptom related processes, such as suspiciousness of pre-
sented evidence, or overconﬁdence in guesses or ‘gut feelings’
(Andreou et al., 2014; Köther et al., 2012; Freeman et al., 2012;
Moritz and Woodward, 2006).
On the hard neutral task, in contrast, lower IQ was associated with
reasoning errors, suggesting that poor task understanding, or difﬁcul-
ties with the nature of evidence-based reasoning may exert more
inﬂuence when the task is harder (less discriminable ratio; more
ambiguous evidence). These errors were primarily inconsistent, and
were also associated with lower levels of negative affect, but not with
delusions.
Error rates were lower on the emotional task, despite the same
levels of difﬁculty as the hard neutral task, raising the possibility that
negative affective biases may reduce the likelihood of choosing the
positive survey, irrespective of the evidence. Consistent with this,
those making hasty but correct decisions on the emotional task
showed higher levels of delusion severity; while choosing the
positive survey, when presented with 50:50 evidence or a positive
word, was associated with lower levels of delusions, and, for salient
errors, with less negative affect.
The tendency to make reasoning errors was not associated with
the PANSS Excitement factor score, arguing against a role for
impulsivity. Salience-based reasoning appeared to account for
around a ﬁfth of errors, across all tasks, rather than just on the
easy neutral task, but other than the content speciﬁc association
with delusions, was not associated with any of the predictor
variables, or with delusion severity.
4.1. Clinical implications
The ﬁndings have implications for cognitive behavioural inter-
ventions for people with delusions. Around half of the reasoning
errors resulted from a tendency to make a decision which directly
Table 5
Mean differences between tasks in the association of clinical variables with the tendencies to jump to conclusions and to make reasoning errors.
Task Mean (S.D.)
n IQ n PANSS emotion PANSS positive Current delusion %a Delusion severity
Error
JTC 85:15 26 99.4 (13.4) 27 10.0 (4.2) 21.3 (5.6) 89 11.3 (3.6)
60:40 39 90.7 (14.5) 41 9.2 (3.6) 19.0 (5.7) 78 10.0 (3.9)
Emot 22 95.1 (13.9) 24 10.3 (4.0) 19.4 (5.4) 79 9.8 (3.7)
No JTC 85:15 10 90.6 (17.3) 11 12.3 (4.2) 17.8 (3.3) 82 9.1 (2.7)
60:40 34 91.1 (13.2) 39 9.6 (4.0) 17.8 (5.2) 74 9.3 (3.3)
Emot 26 95.1 (11.2) 29 10.3 (4.7) 18.1 (6.3) 72 9.4 (3.8)
No error
JTC 85:15 73 91.0 (12.9) 78 10.4 (4.4) 18.6 (5.5) 81 9.8 (3.7)
60:40 34 95.6 (13.0) 37 11.4 (4.2) 19.3 (5.7) 84 9.9 (3.7)
Emot 44 92.2 (15.1) 48 9.8 (4.2) 19.6 (5.2) 88 10.3 (3.4)
No JTC 85:15 81 96.3 (14.1) 88 10.1 (4.3) 17.9 (6.0) 76 9.4 (3.7)
60:40 80 97.2 (14.1) 83 10.6 (4.7) 18.5 (6.0) 82 10.0 (3.7)
Emot 91 95.3 (14.2) 94 10.4 (4.3) 18.1 (6.0) 77 9.7 (3.8)
Key: IQ: Intelligence Quotient as measured by the Quick Test; PANSS: Positive & Negative Syndrome Scale (Kay, 1991).
a Current delusion of moderate severity 43 on any PANSS delusion item (1, 5 or 6); Emot: Emotional Task; JTC: Jumping to Conclusions data-gathering bias.
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contradicted the presented material, even in the face of repeated
evidence to the contrary. This seemed to be particularly character-
istic of people with positive symptoms on the easy task. It was not
associated with lower IQ. The ﬁndings raise the possibility that
this tendency sometimes contributes to delusion maintenance.
Simply accruing more evidence may not help these people, and an
alternative strategy to data-gathering may be needed. Working
directly on beliefs about the nature of evidence and reasoning, and
the meaning of a particular piece of evidence might be useful. A
different subset of participants made reasoning errors on the hard
task, and had lower IQ scores. General remedial strategies, in
addition to addressing data-gathering, may be useful for these
people, who may be making reasoning errors simply due to lack of
understanding, or poor concentration. This tendency was not
associated with delusions. Affective biases may have acted to
reduce errors on the emotional task in this study, and could also
therefore inﬂuence delusional reasoning.
4.2. Limitations
The study has a number of limitations. Participants were selected
not only for a research study, but also for ability to complete a
particular task, and may not, therefore, be representative of all
people with similar diagnoses. The measure of IQ is limited, and
replication with a more comprehensive assessment of neuropsycho-
logical functioning would allow stronger conclusions to be drawn.
We carried out multiple comparisons, and while the association of
JTC with reasoning errors is well-established, the other ﬁndings
require replication. Task understanding was not formally assessed,
and although apparently ‘illogical’ decisions were associated with
high IQ, it remains possible that participants had simply misunder-
stood the nature of the task. However, poor task understanding is not
always readily distinguishable from a ‘psychotic-like’ performance,
which, by deﬁnition implies a limited inﬂuence of current evidence
on decision-making. We employed a novel coding of errors, and,
while we considered this coding to have more validity (in that it was
directly linked to what each participant had seen, rather than
experimentally determined), results were in fact almost identical to
those that would have been found using standard coding of errors,
and suggests that recoding may not be necessary. For the emotional
task in particular, standard coding preserves the link with content
and may therefore be superior. Associations were cross-sectional, so
may not be causal, and the term ‘predictor’ is used in a statistical
sense only. A longitudinal study of changes in delusions in relation to
reasoning errors would help in testing causal relationships. Our
cross-sectional design did not permit experimental manipulation of
task parameters, such as ratio discriminability and ambiguity of the
evidence presented, which could also clarify causal relationships.
Nevertheless, the tendency to make contradictory decisions is clear,
and has not previously been investigated in the literature.
4.3. Conclusions
Reasoning errors are associated with hasty decision making,
but only the minority of reasoning errors result from being misled
by limited data. A high proportion of reasoning errors directly
contradicted the evidence presented, particularly on the easy task,
where this tendency was associated with positive symptoms and
higher functioning. In contrast, reasoning errors on the hard task
were associated with low IQ. Direct interventions focused on the
meaning and use of evidence, and not just on gathering more data,
may be a helpful addition to cognitive behavioural reasoning
interventions.
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